Case of Ge Growth

CHRISTOPHER A. BARTLETT GEs increment system The Immelt Initiative Yet, for the past year GEs serving harm had been stuck at around $35, implying a multiple of around 20 successions requital, notwithstanding half its price-to- boodle (P/E) symmetry in the heady long time of 2000. (See present 2 for GEs 10-year share price history. ) It baffle Immelt that the securities attention did non seem to share the belief that he and his authority aggroup had in his ontogeny forecasts. The derivation is currently trading at atomic number 53 of the lowest meshing multiples in a decade, he said. Investors decide the stock price, but we love the way GE is positi 1d.We absorb right(a) results and good governance. . . . What get let out it carry on to move the stock? 1 Taking Charge Setting the Agenda On Friday, family 7, 2001, Immelt took over the reins of GE from Jack Welch, the nearlegendary chief operate(a) officer who preceded him. Four days later, two planes crashed into the World Trade content towers, and the world was thrown into turmoil. Not yet did 9/11 destabilize an already fragile postInternet-bubble stock market, but it excessively triggered a popturn in an overheated economy, leading to a f either in confidence that soon spread into other economies worldwide.Do No After the chaos of the first few post-9/11 days during which he checked on GE casualties, true a $10 trillion donation to the families of rescue workers, and dispatched mobile generators and medical equipment to the World Trade Center, on September 18 Immelt at last center on reassuring the fiscal markets by purchasing 25,000 GE shares on his personal account. Three days later, he appeared onward a group of financial analysts and promised that 2001 dough would make maturate by 11% and by double digits again in 2002.As im coerceive as such a performance great power hurl appeared, it was less than Welchs expansive suggestion in the heady days of 2000 that GEs reachs could enkindle at 18% per annum in the future. 2 The net result was that by the end of Immelts first week as chief executive officer, GEs shares had dropped 20%, winning almost $80 cardinal off the keep federations market capitalization. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Professor Christopher A.Bartlett prepared this case from published sources. HBS cases are real solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of capital data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. Copyright 2006 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request license to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http//www. hbsp. harvard. edu.No part of this outcome may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, uptaked in a spread planing machine, or catching i n any form or by any meanselectronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwisewithout the leave of Harvard Business School. This document is certain for phthisis solely by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until horrible 2009. write or bankers bill is an infringement of copyright. emailsaved harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. tC op yo In February 2006, after quaternary and a half years in the CEO role, Jeff Immelt felt General Electric (GE) was finally poised for the double-digit fruit for which he had been positioning it.Having dear announced an 11% increase in taxs for 2005 (including 8% innate result), he was in a flash forecasting a tho 10% tax income increase in 2006. And following 12% growth in earnings from chronic trading operations in 2005 (with all six vocationes carry doneing double-digit increases), he committed to leveraging the 2006 revenues into an even keen 12% to 17% earnings increase. It was a bold pledge for a $150 one gazillion million globular cor poration. (See Exhibit 1 for GE financial data, 20012004. ) rP os t 9-306-087 REV NOVEMBER 3, 2006 306-087GEs outgrowth schema The Immelt Initiative To make matters worse, as the year wore on, a s sensdal that had been engulfing Enron finally led to that confederations bankruptcy. Soon, other companies were caught up in accusations of financial manipulation, including Tyco, a company that had billed itself as a mini GE. Again, the market punished GE stock, forethoughted that its astronomic and complex operations were too difficult to rede. beyond all this immediate market pressure, Immelt was acutely aware that he stood in the very long wickedness cast by his predecessor, Welch.During his 20 years as CEO, Welch had built GE into a highly train, highly efficient machine that delivered ordered growth in sales and earningsnot solely done effective operations management that resulted in organic growth (much of it productivity- letn) of 5% yearbookly, but to a fault with a co ntinuous stream of timely acquisitions and clever deal making. This two-pronged access had resulted in double-digit profit increases finished and through most of the 1990s. Building on the Past, Imagining the FutureImmelt committed to building on what he see as the philia elements of the companys past success a portfolio of rigid traffices, bound through a manage of companywide strategic initiatives and managed by swell people in a culture that was performance driven and adaptive. It was a source of competitive advantage that Immelt felt was not easily imitated. It requires financial and cultural committednesss over decades, he said. Having committed to GEs fundamental descent model, Immelt wasted little time in articulating a tonic vision of growth based on using GEs size and assortment as facultys rather than weaknesses.He commanded to take the company into prodigious, fundamental high-engineering al-Qaida industries, places where he felt GE could have competitive advantage and where others could not easily follow. He elaborated this into a vision of a global, technology-based, proceeds-intensive company by defining a growth schema based on quint lynchpin elements 2 This document is veritable for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until high-minded 2009. write or bank bill is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. Do No Our aires are closely integrated.They share leading edge agate line initiatives, excellent financial disciplines, a tradition of share natural endowment and better practices, and a culture whose hind end is absolute unyielding integrity. Without these stiff ties, we could actually merit the label conglomerate that people ofttimes inaccurately apply to us. That condition right does not apply to GE. . . . What we have is a company of different benefits whose nerve center is truly greater than the parts a company executing with excellence despite a venomous global economy. . . . We believe GE is different, and one of the things that makes us different is that in good times and in toughwe deliver.That is who we are. 4 tC While recognizing the indigence for change, Immelt saw little need to c signenge the grassroots business model on which GE had operated for decades. Like his predecessor, he bristled at the characterization of GE as a conglomerate, preferring to see it as a well-integrated, diversified company. On fetching charge, he explained op yo The consistent reliability of GEs growth had created an image in shareholders minds of a powerful machine that could not be stopped and earned the company a significant premium over price/earnings multiples in the roomy stock market.As a result, over two decades, GE had generated a compound yearbook total return to shareholders of more than(prenominal)(prenominal)(prenominal)(prenominal) than 23% per annum through the 1980s and 1990s. (See Exhibit 3 for summary GE financials, 19812000. ) entirely Im melt was very conscious that he could not hope to replicate that performance by solely inveterate the same strategy. I looked at the world post-9/11 and realized that over the contiguous 10 or 20 years, there was not going to be much tailwind, he said. It would be more driven by innovation, and a premium would be placed on companies that could generate their own growth. 3 rP os t GEs growth scheme The Immelt Initiative 306-087 Technical leadership accept that technology had been at GEs core since the day Thomas Edison founded the company, Immelt committed to technical leadership as a key driver of future growth. Services acceleration By building service businesses on its long installed base of aircraft engines, power turbines, locomotive engines, medical devices, and other hardware, Immelt believed GE could better serve customers darn generating high margins and raising entry barriers.Commercial excellence Reflecting his own sales and marketing background, Immelt committed to creating a first commercial culture to overlay the engineering bias and financial orientation of GEs ascendant business approach below Welch. issue weapons platforms Finally, he recognized that significant resource reallocation would be necessary to build advanced business platforms capitalizing on unstopp adequate to(p) trends that would provide growth into the future.Because plans at GE always came with measurable goals attached, Immelt committed to increasing the companys organic growth from its historical 5% annual rate to 8% and, beginning in 2005, to generating consistent double-digit earnings growth. Investing through the downwards Cycle Do No Within weeks of taking charge, he started making significant investments to align GEs businesses for growth. Seeing opportunities to expand its NBC broadcast business to capture the fast-growing Hispanic advertising market, for employment, the company acquired the Telemundo and Bravo networks.And its power-generation busi ness acquired Enrons wind energy business as a sweet platform that management felt was positioned for long-term growth and high returns in the future. In addition to these and other cancel business extensions, management identify whole new segments that provided a stronger foundation for innovation and where future market opportunities would drive rapid growth. For example, in security systems, GE acquired Interlogix, a medium-sized player with excellent technology, and in pee services, it bought BetzDearborn, a leading company with 2,000 sales engineers on the ground.Internally, Immelt also lost little time in making big financial commitments to the growth strategy. Within his first six months, he committed $century million to upgrade GEs major look and enlargement (R&D) facility at Nishayuna in upstate radical York. In addition to building new laboratories, the investment provided for new meeting centers on Nishayunas 525-acre campus, creating an environment where business ma nagers and technologists could meet to discuss priorities. 3 This document is authorized for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until August 2009. copy or broadsheet is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. du or 617. 783. 7860. tC Perhaps predictably, the press was s unploughedical of the notion that a $130 trillion company could grow at two to trinity times the global gross national product (GNP) rate. Still, there was no shortage of advice for the new CEO in his attempt to make the company do so. Some suggested he should sell off the advanced lighting and appliances businesses. 5 Others proposed bold expansionsinto the hospital business, for example. 6 And as always, there were calls for GE to burst up the company and sell off its component businesses. 7 provided Immelt insisted GE had great businesses that provided a strong foundation for the future.All he planned to do was rebalance and renew the portfolio, and then drive growth from the revitalized base. op yo globalisation Building on an old Welch initiative, Immelt committed to expanding GEs sourcing strategy and market access worldwide, in particular focusing on its underexploited opportunities in developing world countries such as China and India. rP os t 306-087 GEs Growth Strategy The Immelt Initiative Scott Donnelly, a 40-year-old researcher who led GEs overall R&D activity, said, GE is not the place for scientists who extremity to work on a concept for years without anybody bothering them.Here scientists can do long-term research, but they have to be spontaneous to spar with the marketing guys. This is the best of both worlds. 8 Beyond its historic Nishayuna R&D facility, in 2000 the company had established a center in Bangalore, India. To build on that global expansion, in 2002 Immelt authorized the construction of a new facility in affect, China. And as the year wore on, he began talking some adding a fourth global facility, probably in Europe. a Despite the slowing econo my, he upped the R&D budget from $286 million in 2000 to $327 million in 2002.When asked about this increase in expending during such a difficult time for the company, he said, Organic growth is the driver. Acquisitions are secondary to thatI cant see us go out and wear a start-up $100 million for technology that, if we had just spent $2 million a year for 10 years, we couldve done a better telephone circuit at. I hate that, I just hate that. 10 Reflecting on his panoptic investments in 2002, a year in which the stock dropped a further 39% from its 2001 close, Immelt said monetary strength gives us the ability to invest in growth and we have viewed this economic cycle as a time to invest.Weve increase the emergence of engineers, salespeople, and service resources. We forget invest more than $3 jillion in technology, including major investments in our global resource centers. Weve strengthened our commitment to China, increasing resources there 25% in 2002, and weve increased our presence in Europe. Acquisitions are a key form of investment for us and we have invested n other(a) $35 one million million in acquisitions over the past two years. They are a key way for us to redeploy silver flow for our future growth. 11Ongoing operations Rigor and reactivity To fund his strategy, Immelt drew his first source of capital from the sale of underperforming businesses, and the companys struggling indemnity business was his prime target for divesture. tho in the depths of an economic downturn, getting good prices for any business was not easy. So the investments needed to drive the companys growth appease relied primarily on funds generated by ongoing operations, and Immelt drove the organization to deliver on the markets expectations for current-year performance.Picking up on initiatives launched years earlier, he harnessed wellembedded capabilities such as Six Sigma and digitization to drive out cost, increase address might, and manage resources more e ffectively. Do a In 2003, GE opened its Shanghai research center and broke ground for another center in Siemenss backyard in Munich, Germany. In 2004, its 2, vitamin D researchers worldwide filed for more than 450 patents. 4 This document is authorized for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until August 2009. copy or circuit board is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. du or 617. 783. 7860. No tC op yo Although Immelt was entrusting to increase his commitment to R&D, he pushed to change the balance of work being done. In addition to developing technologically sophisticated new products, he wanted to commit more resources to longer-term research that might not pay off for a decade or more. In the past, limited commitment to such long-term research had frustrated many of the centers science and engineering Ph. Ds. (Science was a dirty word for a go, said Anil Duggal, a project leader on the advanced lighting project. forthwith its not. )9 In selecting the long-term pr ojects for funding, Donnelly whittled down more than 2,000 proposals and then worked with researchers to come up with the technologies that could transform a business. From the 20 big approximations his staff proposed, Donnelly had them focus on a group of five dollar bill, representing fields as diverse as nanotechnology, advanced propulsion, and biotechnology. rP os t GEs Growth Strategy The Immelt Initiative 306-087 In this tough environment, Immelts primary operating focus was on cash flow, and he realigned all the powerful tools in GEs toolbox to meet that objective.For example, Six Sigma discipline was applied to reducing the cash tied up in inventory and receivables, while touch digitization was focused on sourcing economies and al-Qaeda efficiencies. By 2002, digitization alone was generating savings of almost $2 billion of savings a year. As always at GE, initiatives were tied to metrics, with 60% of incentive compensation dependent on cash flow generation. So, despite a tough 2002 economy that held GEs revenue growth to 5%, its cash flow from operations was $15. 2 billion, up 10% on the previous year. Do NoThe new CEO also wanted to create a more open and less hard-edged environment within the company. He asked the 2002 class of GEs Executive Development Course (EDC) to study where GE stood in its approach to corporate responsibility. b Historically, this was not an issue that had received much attention at GE. Although Welch had always evince the importance of integrity and compliance, he had denominaten little interest in r apieceing beyond that legal requirement. The several(prenominal) dozen participants in the 2002 EDC visited investors, regulators, activists, and 65 companies in the U. S. nd Europe to understand how GE was performing in toll of corporate responsibility. They taradiddleed to top management that although the company was ranked in the top five for its financial performance, investment observe, and management talent, it wa s number 72 for social responsibility. One outcome of the EDC groups report was that Immelt appointed GEs first vice president for corporate citizenship. He tapped dog Corcoran, a trusted colleague from his days runnelning GE Medical Systems, to lead an effort to tick off that the company was more sensitive and responsive to its broader societal responsibilities.Ever the pragmatist, Immelt saw this as more than just an selfless response. He believed it was all important(predicate) for the company to re chief(prenominal) effective To be a great company today, you also have to be a good company. The reason people come to work for GE is that they want to be involved in something bigger than themselves. They bEDC was the top-level course at GEs renowned Crotonville fosterage center and was reserved for those destined for the most senior echelons of management at GE. As part of their studies, each EDC class was charge a major corporate issue to study in teams and then report back to GEs Corporate Executive Council. C Immelt understood that in such a skeptical environment, there was a need for a CEO to establish much more nudeness and trust. Since his natural style tended to be open and communicative, he was perfectly comfortable with the idea of increasing the foil of GEs often complex operations. In July 2002, to make the performance of GEs financial businesses easier to understand, he broke GE Capital into four separate businesses, each with its own balance sheet and explicit growth strategy. He also committed to communicating more frequently and in more detail with investors. We have the goal of talking about GE externally the way we run it internally, he said. After his first analysts meeting, where everyone got an advance bound copy of the data and forecasts, BusinessWeek commented, Thats already a break with the Welch regime where, some aver, you were s keepingd to blink in case you missed a chart. 14 op yo Although this disciplined approach was rem iniscent of GE in decades past, Immelts management style contrasted with Welchs in many ways. First, he recognized that in a post-Enron world, corporate executives faced a more skeptical and often cynical group of critics.For example, an article in BusinessWeek suggested, Increasingly, the Welch record of steady double digit growth is smell less worry a miracle of brilliant management and more like clever news report that kept investors fat and happy in boom times. 12 And The Economist opined, Immelt has had a torrid time since taking over from Jack Welch, GEs former boss, in 2001. Waking from the dreamy 1990s, investors discovered that GE was not, after all, a smooth earnings machine that pumped out profit growth of 16 to 18% a year. 13 This document is authorized for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until August 2009.Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. rP os t 5 306-087 GEs Growth Strategy The Immelt Initiative want to work hard, they want to get promoted, they want stock options. But they also want to work for a company that makes a difference, a company thats doing great things in the world. . . . Its up to us to use our platform to be a good citizen. Because not only is it a nice thing to do, its a business imperative. 15 Rebuilding the Foundation Beginning a Marathon In the midst of the turmoil, however, he reminded himself of advice he received from his predecessor. One of the things Jack said early on that I think is totally right is Its a marathon, its not a sprint, Immelt recalled. You have to have a plan, and you have to stick with it. You have to modify it at times, but every day youve got to get out there and play it hard. 17 Entering 2003 with that thought in mind, Immelt proceed to drive his growth-strategy agenda. Rebalancing the Portfolio Do Two days after announcing final terms in its purchase of Vivendi- universal diversion (VUE), GE announced an agreement to purchase Amersham , a British life sciences and medical diagnostic company that Immelt had been pursuing for many months.He believed that wellness care was moving into an era of biotechnology, advanced diagnostics, and targeted therapies and combining GEs imaging technology with Amershams pharmaceutical biomarkers, for example, could create whole new ways of diagnosing and treating diseases. At $10 billion, this was a more expensive acquisition but one that he believed could boost GEs $9 billion medical products business to a $15 billion business by 2005. More important, he saw it as an engine of growth that would continue for years and even decades into the future. In his mind, it was a classic growth platform. This document is authorized for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until August 2009. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. No Immelts vision was to create a media business that was better positioned for a digital future. The NBC franch ise, although strong, was being buffeted by changes in media dispersion that saw the share of broadcast televisions market shrinking. common added content, production facilities, cable distribution, and a strong management teamall assets that Immelt felt could greatly strengthen GEs core business.On top of that, the $5. 5 billion up-front purchase price for assets valued at $14 billion was seen as an excellent buy. tC The year turned out to be an important one in the new CEOs efforts to rebuild the business portfolio on which he would drive GEs growth. Even after complete $35 billion worth of acquisitions in the previous two years, 2003 became the biggest acquisition year in GEs history with total commitments exceeding $30 billion. The first megadeal came when the company decided to bid for the Universal entertainment business of French conglomerate Vivendi.Defying those who suggested that GE should exit the volatile media business, Immelt pushed ahead with the acquisition, which included Universals film library, film studio, cable services, and theme park. This is about stuff we know how to do, he said. We understand the nuances of this industry and where its going. 18 op yo As 2003 began, Immelt was not sorry to see the end of his first spacious year as CEO. Despite all his efforts, 2002 had been a terrible year for the company. Revenues were up only 5% after a 3% decline the prior year.And rather than the double-digit growth he had promised, 2002 earnings increased by only 7%. By years end the stock was at $24, down 39% from the year beforehand and 60% from its all-time high of $60 in August 2000. Having lived through a struggling economy, the post-9/11 chaos, new regulatory demands following the corporate scandals, and an unstable global policy-making situation, Immelt commented, This was a not a great year to be a rookie CEO. 16 rP os t GEs Growth Strategy The Immelt Initiative 306-087The real issue that many saw in the deal, however, was less about strategic fit than organizational compatibility. The concern was that the highly innovative, science-oriented talent that Amersham had genuine in the U. K. would not thrive when swallowed up by GE. It was the same criticism that Immelt had heard when critics wondered whether the creative talent in Universals film studios would tolerate the management discipline for which GE was so well-known. But the idea of bringing creative and innovative outside(a)rs into GE was part of the appeal to Immelt.He saw people like Sir William Castell, Amershams CEO, as major assets who could help develop in GE the culture of innovation that he longed to build. To emphasize the point, he put U. K. -based Castell in charge of the combined $14 billion business renamed GE wellness Care and made him a vice chairman of GE. For the first time, one of the companys major businesses would be headquartered outside of the linked States, a move that Immelt felt fit well with his pierce of globalization. Focus ing on Customers, Emphasizing Services Do NoIn addition to his portfolio changes, the new CEO kept running(a) on his internal growth initiatives. As an ex-salesman, Immelt had always directed attention toward the customer, and one of his priorities was to redirect GEs somewhat internal focusan unintended by-product of Welchs obsession with operating efficiency and cost-cuttingtoward the external environment. In a deflationary world, you could get margin by working productivity, he said. instantaneously you need marketing to get a price. 19 In 2001, among his first appointments had been Beth Comstock, named as GEs first chief marketing officer.Next, to drive the change deeper, he redeployed most of GEs large business development staff into marketing roles, then asked each of GEs businesses to appoint a VP-level marketing head, many of whom had to be recruited from the outside. We hired literally thousands of marketers, he said. For the best, we created the Experienced Commercial L eadership Program, the potpourri of intensive course weve long offered in pay. Thats 200 people a year, every year. 20 cAfter taking a $1. 4 billion write-off in 2004 payable to claims relating to asbestos and September 11, the company finally sold ERC for $8. billion in 2005, but only after booking another $2. 9 billion damages loss. tC To communicate the major portfolio transformation he had undertaken to date, in 2003 Immelt began describing GEs businesses as growth engines and cash generators (see Exhibit 4). He characterized the former, which accounted for 85% of earnings, as market leaders that could grow at 15% annually through the business cycles with high returns. The latter were acknowledged as being more cyclical in nature but with consistently strong cash flows. p yo The other great challenge in the ongoing task of portfolio rebalancing was that GE was finding it difficult to dispose of some of the assets it no longer regarded as vital. While the recession provided l ots of buying opportunities if one was willing to step up and invest, it was hardly an ideal environment in which to be selling businesses. For GE, the biggest challenge was to find buyers for the struggling insurance businesses. Although its 2003 sale of trio of its major insurance entities had freed up $4. billion in cash, the company was still assay to find a buyer for Employers Reinsurance go with (ERC), a business generating huge ongoing losses due to its poor underwriting in the late 1990s. c And several other GE businesses from motors to super adhesives remained on the blocks with no bidder offering a price the company was willing to accept. Part of the problem was that bidders felt that if GE had run the business for years, most of the potentiality savings had already been extracted, making the units being offered less attractive for a company that wanted to squeeze out costs.This document is authorized for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until August 2009. Copying or post ing is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. rP os t 7 306-087 GEs Growth Strategy The Immelt Initiative In 2003, with strong marketing capabilities now embedded in the businesses, he formed a Commercial Council to bring GEs best sales and marketing leaders together in a forum that could transfer best practice, drive initiatives rapidly through the organization, and develop a world-class commercial culture.Chaired by Immelt personally, the councils agenda included developing worldclass marketing capabilities, taking Six Sigma to customers, and driving sales force effectiveness. As always, metrics were attached. Using a tool called remuneration Promoter Score (NPS), the company began to track changes in customer attitudes and committal, tying compensation to improvements in NPS scores. If we can create a sales and marketing function thats as good as finance at GE, Ill change this company, he said. But it will take ten years to drive these cha nges. 21 Yet despite all these efforts, the reality was that just as many of GEs roducts were becoming commodities, its service contracts were increasingly going to the lowest bidder and not providing the barriers to entry they once did. GEs solution was to make itself indispensable by building enduring relationships based not only on offering its products and services but also its expertise. One initiative, dubbed At the Customer, For the Customer (ACFC, as it soon became known), was designed to bring GEs most effective internal tools and practices to bear on its customers challenges. Immelt used health care as an example of what GE could offer.With cost control being a major concern as health-care expenditures headed toward 20% of GDP, Immelt felt that GE could help its customers, only 50% of which were profitable. Through our health care services agreements, we are the hospitals productivity partner, he said. We completed more than 6,000 Six Sigma projects with health care provid ers in 2002 and these projects are improving the quality of patient care and lowering costs. 22 In addition, the company began bundle up its services and linking its products to clinical randomness technology.It also added a health-care financial services business to the GE Health Care organization to provide it with specialized financing support. The phrase solutions provider is so overused it makes us all snore, said Immelt. I want GE to be essential to those whom we serve, a critical part of the profit equation, a long-term partner, a friend. 23 Driving for Growth New Platforms, New Processes Beginning in 2002, Immelt had challenged his business leaders to identify growth business platforms with the potential to generate $1 billion in operating profit within the next few years.In response, six opportunities had emerged health-care information systems, security and sensors, water technology and services, oil and gas technology, Hispanic broadcasting, and consumer finance. By the end of 2002, these businesses represented $9 billion in revenue and $2 billion in operating profit. But, as Immelt pointed out, at a 15% annual organic growth rate, they were on track to become a much larger portion of GEs future business portfolio. With 2003s major acquisitions such as Amersham and VUE, the company added new growth platforms such as biosciences and film/DVD to its list.Through other acquisitions, renewable energy Do 8 This document is authorized for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until August 2009. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. No tC op yo Immelt also believed GE could significantly strengthen its customer relationships by becoming more of a services provider. In 2002, $23 billion of the companys $132 billion revenue came from services, but with its massive installed base of more than 100,000 long-lived jet engines, locomotives, power generators, and medical devices in the field, the CEO saw the p otential service annuity stream.As someone who had increased GE Medical Systems share of service business from 25% to 42% in the three and a half years he headed that operation, Immelt was convinced that services could grow much faster than hardware and at much higher(prenominal) profit levels. To underscore his belief, whenever businesses developed important service contractsGE Transportations sale of its IT-based dispatch system to railroad customers to increase locomotive utilization, for examplehe celebrated them very publicly. rP os t GEs Growth Strategy The Immelt Initiative 06-087 (wind, solar, biomass), coal gasification, and supply chain financing became elements of GEs new growth platform. And the speech pattern on services built a series of businesses in environmental services, nondestructive testing, and asset optimization that were also seen as having high growth potential. In defining and then building these growth platforms, GE followed its normal disciplined approac h. First, management segmented the broad markets and identified the high-growth segments where they believed they could add value.Then, they typically launched their initiative with a footling acquisition in that growth platform. After integrating it into GE, the objective was to transform the acquisitions business model by applying GE growth initiatives (services and globalization, for example) that could leverage its existent resources and capabilities. As a final step, the company applied its financial muscle to the new business, allowing it to invest in organic growth or further acquisitions. The objective was to grow it rapidly while simultaneously generating solid returns.As Immelt summarized, A key GE strength is our ability to conceptualize the future, to identify unstoppable trends, and to develop new ways to grow. The growth platforms we have identified are markets that have above average growth rates and can uniquely benefit from GEs capabilities. . . . Growth is the ini tiative, the core competency that we are building in GE. 24 Aligning trouble New People Profiles The biggest challenge Immelt saw in implementing his agenda was to make growth the personal mission of every one of the companys 310,000 employees worldwide. If I want people to take more risks, go bigger problems, and grow the business in a way thats never been done before, I have to make it personal, he said. So I tell people, Start your career tomorrow. If you had a bad year, learn from it and do better. If you had a good year, Ive already forgotten about it. 25 As the company began to implement its new growth strategy, the CEO hard-pressed that some of his current management team might not have the skills or abilities to succeed in the more entrepreneurial risk-taking environment he was trying to create.Realizing that this implied a massive challenge to develop a new generation of what he termed growth leaders, he said Historically, we have been known as a company that developed professional managers . . . broad problem solvers with experience in multiple businesses and functions. However, I wanted to raise a generation of growth leaderspeople with market depth, customer touch, and technical understanding. This change emphasizes depth. We are expecting people to spend more time in a business or a job.We think this will help leaders develop market instincts so important for growth, and the confidence to grow global businesses. 26 Do No Beyond changes in career path development that emphasized more in-depth experience and fewer job rotations, GEs HR professionals wanted to identify the new personal competencies that growth leaders would need to exhibit. Benchmarking GE against best practice, they researched the leadership tC op yo GEs expansion into Hispanic broadcasting provides an example of the process.After identifying this as a fast-growth segment in its broadcast business, the company acquired Telemundo, the number two player in the Hispanic entertainme nt segment. Believing that the Hispanic demographic would drive growth, management felt that it would be able to apply GEs capabilities to fix Telemundos struggling business model. Through 2002 and 2003, NBC offered its management and schedule expertise, helping Telemundo to evolve from purchasing 80% of its content to producing two-thirds of its own broadcast material.In the second half of 2003, Telemundo grew its ratings by 50% over the first half and captured 25% of the Hispanic advertising market. The company expected revenues to grow more than 20% in 2004. This document is authorized for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until August 2009. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. rP os t 9 306-087 GEs Growth Strategy The Immelt Initiative profiles at 15 large global companies Toyota and Dell among themthat had grown for more than a decade at three times GDP rates or better.In late 2004, they arrived at a list of five action -oriented leadership traits they would require an external focus that defines success in market terms an ability to think glide byly to simplify strategy into specific actions, make decisions, and communicate priorities the vision and courage to take risks on people and ideas an ability to energize teams through inclusiveness and connection with people, building both loyalty and commitment and an expertise in a function or domain, using depth as a source of confidence to drive change.To help develop these characteristics, each business created 20 to 30 backbone jobs customer-facing, change-oriented assignments in which growth leaders could be developed in assignments of at least four to five years. The new leadership competencies also became the criteria for all internal training programs and were integrated into the evaluation processes used in all management feedback. Funding the Growth Operating Excellence Do Yet another operating initiative called simplification aimed at red ucing overhead from 11% of revenue to 8%.Targeting reductions in the number of legal entities, headquarters, rooftops, computer systems, and other overhead-type costs not directly linked to growth, the company set a goal of removing $3 billion of such costs over three years. In the first year, the commercial finance business consolidated into three customer service/operations centers and expected to save $ three hundred million over three years. In another simplification move, the consumer and industrial business brought its three existing headquarters into one, saving more than $100 million in structural costs.And the transportation and energy businesses began sharing some IT and operational assets that also reduced structural costs by some $ three hundred million annually. 10 This document is authorized for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until August 2009. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. No By 2004, while the drives for cash generation and cost reduction were still in place, Immelt added a new initiative called Lean Six Sigma, which borrowed the classic tools of lean manufacturing and set them to new applications.In its industrial businesses, the focus was on reducing working capital and improving return on equity, while in its commercial finance business it was on margin expansion, risk management, and cost reduction. Through these efforts, in 20032004, the company achieved $2. 7 billion in improvement in working capital and expected that phase of progress to continue. tC While driving growth, Immelt never forgot that he inherited a great operating company. He did not want long-term growth to distract managers from current performance. Ive always worried about a jailbreak, he said. How do we make sure people dont say Jeff doesnt care about productivity? 29 So he insisted that innovation be funded with an use to lead, but paid for by increasing productivity. 30 During 2003, for example, abou t one-third of the Six Sigma specialists were focused on a new initiative called cash entitlement. The target was for GE to be twice as good as competitors on a number of benchmarks such as accounts receivable or inventory turnover. At ull potential, Immelt told his team, it would free up an excess $7 billion in cash. op yo Immelt was also quite involved personally in developing growth leaders on his team. In response to a question about his time utilization, he said, Im probably spend 20% of my time with customers, 30% of my time on people, teaching and coaching . . . and 10% of my time on governance, working with the board, and meeting with investors. The rest would be time spent on the plumbing of the company, working on operating reviews and strategy sessions. 27 But, as he regularly pointed out, the time he spent on the plumbing in operating reviews and strategy sessionstouch points, he called themwas primarily about people development. He was committed to make every event a learning prospect, every activity a source of evaluation. 28 rP os t GEs Growth Strategy The Immelt Initiative 306-087 Preparing for Liftoff Innovation and Internationalization As 2004 progressed, the worldwide economy in stages started to turn around, and GE began showing signs of more robust growth. By years end, nine of its 11 businesses had grown their earnings by double digits.For the first time, Immelt sounded confident that the company was finally moving beyond the disappointing results of the previous three years and onto the growth trajectory for which he had been preparing it. In his annual letter to stakeholders in February 2005, he recalled his time as a college football player to draw a sports affinity to GEs recent performance GE has played hurt for the last few years. . . . So we went to the training room. These difficult years triggered a critical review of our capabilities, and as a result, we initiated an exciting transformation.We invested more than $60 billi on to create a faster-growing company. We committed to divest $15 billion of slow-growth assets. We built new capabilities, launched new products, expanded globally and invested in the GE brand. Now the company has begun an era of strong performance. . . . Were back at full strength. This is our time. 31 To underscore the point, he predicted that GEs growth enginesbusinesses whose earnings growth since 1999 had averaged 15% annuallywould generate 90% of the companys earnings in 2005, compared with only 67% in 2000. See Exhibit 5 for a representation of the shift. ) Due to this transformation of the business portfolio and also the addition of more than a dozen new capabilities from biosciences to renewable energy, Immelt claimed that for the first time in 20 years, GE was positioned to grow its industrial earnings faster than its financial services earnings. Imagination Breakthroughs Do No To drive his earlier growth platform challenge deep into the organization, the CEO launched a p rocess he called imagination breakthroughs, quickly abbreviated to IBs.These were projects technological innovations, market expansion opportunities, product commercialization proposals, or ideas to create value for customersthat had the potential to generate, over a three-year horizon, at least $100 million in incremental earnings. The process required each business leader to submit at least three breakthrough proposals a year for review by the Commercial Council. Imagination Breakthroughs are a protected class of ideassafe from budget slashers because Ive blessed each one, said Immelt. What were trying to do is take risks, using my point of view.I have the biggest risk profile and broadest time horizon in the company . . . so I can bring to bear the right risk-taking and time horizon tradeoffs. 32 A year into the program, 80 IB initiatives had been identified and qualifiedhalf technically based programs and half commercial innovations. Immelt had assigned the companys best people to drive them and had committed $5 billion over the next three years to fully fund them. In that time, they were expected to deliver $25 billion of additional revenue growth. By 2005, 25 IBs were generating revenue. The big difference is that the business leaders have no choices here, Immelt explained. nothing is allowed not to play. Nobody can say, Im going to sit this one out. Thats the way you drive change. 33 Believing that the businesses could initiate 200 such projects over the next year or two, Immelt said, Our employees want to live their dreams. It is up to me to give them that platform. I can help them take smart risks that will win over time. . . . We aim to be the best in the world at turning shrimpy ideas into huge businesses. 34 tC op yoThis document is authorized for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until August 2009. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. rP os t 11 306-087 GEs Growth Strategy The Immelt Ini tiative Of Town Halls and Dreaming To stimulate ideas that would drive the imagination breakthroughs, Immelt go along to push his leaders to get out in the field and in touch with the market. Setting the example himself by spending at least five days a month with customers, he began creating forums he called town hall meetings. Here, several hundred customers would gather together to hear where GEs CEO wanted to take his company, to provide input on that direction, and to suggest how GE could be more helpful to them. For example, in one meeting with the CEOs and key operating managers of companies in the railroad industry, Immelt spent an afternoon listening to their view of their industry situation, the key trends, and its five- to 10-year outlook. GEs CEO then asked them to think through a number of scenarios including higher fuel prices, a growth in east-west rail shipments due to increasing Chinese imports, and so on.He then challenged them to think through how they would spend $200 million to $400 million on R&D at GE. The ensuing debate highlighted, for example, the relative importance of spending on fuel efficiency versus information technology to optimize rail movement planning. But Immelt was careful to note that while the company listened cautiously to the input, GE always made its own choices on these investments. I love customers. I get great insight from them, but I would never let them set our strategy for us, he said. But by talking to them, I can put it in my own language.Customers always pay our bills, but they will never pick our people or set our strategies. 36 Infrastructure for Developing Countries A New Growth Market In 2004, Immelts push for globalization also began bearing fruit with revenues from outside the U. S. growing 18% to $72 billion. Of this, the developing world accounted for $21 billion, an even more impressive 37% increase on the previous year, leading Immelt to predict that over the next decade, 60% of GEs international gr owth would come from developing countries.China represented the most visible growth opportunity, but he also planned to expand aggressively into India, Russia, Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and South America. Through the imagination breakthrough program, proposals for improving GEs ways of doing business in the developing world began glittery up. For example, one plan that would quickly generate $100 million in sales involved transportation system unassembled locomotives to Russia, India, and China, where they would be assembled in local factories and workshops. Furthermore, through an initiative known as one GE, the ompany began creating vertical teams to deliver what it called enterprise selling. For example, companywide enterprise teams had targeted the Olympics in Beijing, Vancouver, and London and were aiming to deliver additional sales of $1 billion in energy, security, lighting, and health-care products to those venues. And increasingly GE was adopting co mpany-to-country relationships in selling infrastructure projects. It was an approach that had helped it book $8 billion in Middle East orders in 2005, twice the level of 2003. Do 12This document is authorized for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until August 2009. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. No tC op yo As an outgrowth of these meetings, Immelt decided to create another forum that he described as dreaming sessions. In these sessions, he engaged in intensive conversations with a group of senior executives drawn from key customers in a particular industry to try to identify major industry trends, their likely implications for them, and how GE might be able to help them.Immelt understood the importance of his own role in these meetings. If I show up, well get six CEOs to show up, he said. So you dont have to cut through anything else if we all do it together. We can make some high-level tradeoffs that way. 35 rP os t GEs Growth Strategy The Immelt Initiative 306-087 Reorganizing for Efficiencyand Growth Driven by such developments, in July 2005, Immelt announced a major reorganization that consolidated GEs 11 businesses into six large units, one of which was GE Infrastructure.Integrating aircraft engines, rail products, water energy, oil and gas, and some financial services, the unit was headed by GE veteran David Calhoun, who aimed to offer one-stop shopping for all infrastructure products and services. Immelts expectation was that by focusing on the needs of an underserved customer groupthe governments of developing countriesGE could tap into investments in developing country infrastructure predicted to be $3 trillion over the next 10 years. Going Forward Immelts Challenges His main challenge now as he saw it was to maintain the growth in this $150 billion global giant.But to those who felt GE was too big to grow so fast, he had a clear response Do No The corporate landscape is littered with companies that allowed themselves to be trapped by size. But GE thrives because we use our size to help us grow. Our depth allows us to lead in big markets by providing unmatched solutions for our customers our breadth allows us to spread concepts across the company, leveraging one small idea to create big financial gains and our strength allows us to take the risks required to grow. . . Our goal is not just to be big, but to use our size to be great. 38 All he had to do now was convince the financial markets that the changes he had initiated would enable this global giant to deliver on his promise of continued double-digit growth. tC In 2006, Immelt felt that GE was well placed on the growth path he had laid out over four years earlier. Between 2002 and 2005, he had put $30 billion of divestitures on the block, completed $65 billion in acquisitions, and made major investments in new capabilities in technology, marketing, and innovation.He now represented GEs growth engine as a link ed six-part process (see Exhibit 6). While the components varied little from his original 2001 list of growth elements, he explained the difference Youve got to have a process. Investors have to see it is repeatable. . . . It took time, though, to understand growth as a process. If I had worked out that wheel-shaped draw in 2001, I would have started with it. But in reality, you get these things by wallowing in them awhile. 37 op yoWhile one objective of the reorganization was to create savings (expected to be $400 million in administrative costs alone), Immelt emphasized that a more important goal was to better align the businesses with customer and market needs. But he also made clear that he wanted to create an organization that gave more opportunity for younger growth leaders to drive their businesses. The six new macrobusiness groupsGE Industrial, GE Commercial monetary Services, NBC Universal, GE Health Care, GE Consumer Finance, and GE Infrastructurewould each be led by one of GEs most experienced top executives.But these individuals would be forced to step back more from operations and spend most of their time coaching, developing, and supporting the younger managers who were to be pulled up into the 50-odd profit-responsible units directly under them. It was all part of the companys commitment to developing its growth leaders and the businesses they ran. This document is authorized for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until August 2009. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. rP os t 13 306-087 -14-Exhibit 1 GEs Performance, 20012005 Selected Financial Data General Electric Company and Consolidated Affiliates (in millions, per share amounts in dollars) Do 2003 $112,886 13,766 2,057 15,823 -587 15,236 7,759 19. 60% 2002 $113,856 15,798 -616 15,182 -1,015 14,167 7,266 27. 20% 2001 $107,558 12,948 1,130 14,078 -287 13,791 6,555 24. 70% $ 1. 37 0. 2 1. 57 -0. 06 1. 51 1. 37 0. 21 1. 58 -0. 06 1. 52 0. 77 32. 4221. 30 30. 98 503,610 647,828 170,309 10,018,587 670,000 $ 1. 58 -0. 06 1. 51 -0. 1 1. 41 1. 59 -0. 06 1. 52 -0. 1 1. 42 0. 73 41. 8421. 40 24. 5 441,768 575,236 138,570 9,947,113 655,000 $ 1. 29 0. 11 1. 4 -0. 03 1. 37 1. 3 0. 11 1. 42 -0. 03 1. 39 0. 66 52. 9028. 25 40. 08 373,550 495,012 77,818 9,932,245 625,000 No 2005 $149,702 18,275 -1,922 16,353 16,353 9,647 17. 60% 2004 $134,481 16,285 534 16,819 16,819 8,594 17. 60% tC 1. 73 -0. 18 1. 55 1. 55 0. 91 37. 3432. 67 35. 05 626,586 673,342 212,281 10,569,805 634,000 161,000 155,000 316,000 This document is authorized for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until August 2009. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860.Selected Financial Data Revenues honorarium from continuing operations before accounting changes compensation (loss) from discontinued operations, net of taxes Earnings before accounting changes Cumulative effect of accounting changes Net earnings Di vidends declared Return on average shareowners equity (a) Per share Earnings from continuing operations before accounting changes diluted Earnings (loss) from discontinued operationsdiluted Earnings before accounting changesdiluted Cumulative effect of accounting changesdiluted Net earningsdiluted Earnings from continuing operations before accounting changes staple fibre Earnings (loss) from discontinued operationsbasic Earnings before accounting changesbasic Cumulative effect of accounting changesbasic Net earningsbasic Dividends declared Stock price range Year-end closing stock price Total assets of continuing operations Total assets Long-term borrowings Shares outstandingaverage (in thousands) Shareowner accountsaverage Employees at year-end United States Other Countries Total Employees op yo 1. 72 -0. 18 1. 54 1. 54 $ 1. 56 0. 05 1. 61 1. 61 1. 57 0. 05 1. 62 1. 62 0. 82 37. 7528. 88 36. 5 618,241 750,507 207,871 10,399,629 658,000 165,000 142,000 307,000 155,000 150,000 30 5,000 $ 161,000 154,000 315,000 158,000 152,000 310,000 generator GE 2005 yearly Report. rP os t GEs Growth Strategy The Immelt Initiative 306-087 Exhibit 2GE Stock Price and P/E Multiple vs. S 500 Performance, 19952005 GE Price & P/E vs. S 500 1995-2006 (indexed 1/1995=100) 700 GE Price & S 500 (indexed 1/95=100) 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 97 96 95 Ja nJa nJa n- GE P/E S 500 GE Price op yo 99 00 01 02 Ja nJa n03 Ja nJa nJa n- 30 20 10 0 04 05 Ja nJa n06 Ja n- 98 Source Thomson Datastream International. Do No tC Ja n- GE P/E (%) This document is authorized for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until August 2009. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. rP os t 60 50 40 15 306-087 -16- Exhibit 3 GE Financial Performance, 19812000 ($ millions) Do 000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1991 1986 1981 $129,853 10,717 -9,296 4,081 25. 7% 25. 0% 24. 0% 3,535 3,138 1,808 12. 2% 8,203 7,280 2,636 492 9,296 8,203 7,280 3,943 $111,630 $100,469 $90,840 $7 9,179 $51,283 $36,725 3,689 N/A 2,492 1,081 17. 3% $27,240 N/A N/A 1,652 715 19. 1% 12,735 10,717 General Electric Company & Consolidated Affiliates Revenues Earnings from continuing operations Loss from discontinued operations 12,735 4,786 Net earnings 5,647 26. 8% Dividends declared 27. 5% No 3. 87 3. 81 1. 71 1. 47 159. 5-94. 3 405,200 71,427 3,277,826 3,268,998 3,274,692 59,663 46,603 355,935 304,012 103. 9-69. 0 76. 6-47. 9 1. 25 1. 08 0. 95 3. 21 2. 80 2. 46 2. 16 3. 27 2. 84 2. 50 2. 20 2. 55 1. 51 1. 04 78. 1-53. 272,402 49,246 3,307,394 166,508 22,602 1,737,863 2. 73 N/A 1. 18 44. 4-33. 2 84,818 100,001 912,594 Earned on average shareowners equity Per share Net earnings N/A N/A N/A 69. 9-51. 1 20,942 1,059 227,528 Net earningsdiluted tC 53. 1-34. 7 167,000 143,000 -310,000 293,000 -130,000 163,000 165,000 155,000 111,000 173,000 84,000 -62,000 -276,000 49,000 Dividends declared 181. 5-125. 0 437,006 82,132 3,299,037 Stock price rangea Total assets of continuing operations L ong-term borrowings Shares outstandingaverage (in thousands) Employees at year-end 168,000 145,000 -313,000 United States 302,000 N/A 71,000 N/A N/A N/A 239,000 284,000 373,000 404,000Other countries Discontinued operations (primarily U. S. ) Total employees op yo Source GE annual reports, various years. This document is authorized for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until August 2009. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. aPrice unadjusted for four 2-for-1 stock splits during the period. rP os t 306-087 -17- Exhibit 4 Do No tC op yo GE Portfolio Growth Engines and Cash Generators This document is authorized for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until August 2009. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860.As of January 1, 2004, GE has reorganized its 13 businesses into 11 focused on markets and customersseven Growth Engines, which generate about 85% of earnings and are mark et leaders with strengths in technology, cost, services, global distribution and capital efficiency and four Cash Generators, which consistently generate strong cash flow and grow earnings in an expanding economy. This chart reflects the most significant changes the combination of Aircraft Engines and Rail into GE Transportation the combination of Industrial Systems and Consumer Products into Consumer & Industrial, with portions of Industrial Systems moving to other businesses and the formation of Infrastructure from portions of Industrial Systems and Specialty Materials. Results for 2003 in this annual report are reported on the 13-business basis in effect in 2003. P os t Source GE 2003 Annual Report, p. 6. 306-087 GEs Growth Strategy The Immelt Initiative Exhibit 5 GEs Representation of its Portfolio Transformation, 20002006 Portfolio Transformation GE has added more than a dozen new capabilities to its seven Growth Engines, which should generate approximately 90% of GEs earnings in 2005, comfortably more than five years ago. The Growth EnginesTransportation, Energy, Healthcare, NBC Universal, Infrastructure, Commercial Finance and Consumer Financeare robust, capital-effective businesses with leadership positions for keep up doubledigit earnings and cash flow growth. New Growth CapabilitiesBiosciences Film + DVD Healthcare Information engineering Renewable Energy (Wind, Solar, Biomass) Coal Gasification Water Security Hispanic Television Oil & Gas geographic expedition Technology Services (Asset Optimization, Environmental Services, Non-Destructive Testing) Vertical Financing Full Supply-Chain Financing Real Estate Operations Global Mortgage Source GE 2004 Annual Report, p. 4. Do 18 This document is authorized for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until August 2009. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. No tC op yo rP os t GEs Growth Strategy The Immelt Initiative 306-087 Exhibit 6 GE Growth Strate gy Core Elements, 2005 Version Customer ValueUse our process excellence to create customer value and drive growth Growth Leaders Inspire and develop people who know how to help customers and GE grow Globalization tC Create opportunities everywhere and expand in developing markets Do No Source -GROWTH IS THE GE INITIATIVE After growing historically at an average of 5% revenue growth, in 2004, we launched this initiative to achieve 8% organic growth per year. This is about twice the rate of our industrial and financial peers. We want to make organic growth a process that is predictable and reliable. - GE 2005 Annual Report. op yo Execute for Growth Commercial Excellence Create a world-class marketing and sales cogency to drive one GE in the marketplace This document is authorized for use only by DINDIN SYARIFUDIN until August 2009. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. rP os t Innovation apply new ideas and develop capabil ities to make them a reality Leadership in Technology Have the best products, content and s